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More recently, the expansion of tribal governmental capacity 
and a corresponding desire to exercise greater tribal self-
determination has run headlong into the federal government’s trust 
responsibility, which is rooted in false and historical notions of Indian 
incompetence.2 The conflict between tribal self-determination and 
federal decision-making takes many forms, but one of the most 
active and promising fields for the discussion of new approaches is 
energy development on Indian lands. For many reasons, Congress, 
President Barack Obama’s administration, and Indian tribes are now 
intensely focused on how federal oversight of energy development 
on tribal lands should be balanced with tribal self-determination. 
This attention has prompted a number of different proposals, some 
of which may lead to a fundamental redefinition of the federal–tribal 
relationship. Thus, energy development on Indian lands is the 
crucible for the latest Indian law crossroads, and, after describing the 
history and factors that have contributed to the current discussion, 
this article outlines pending administrative and legislative proposals, 
one of which may represent the road forward to a new era of tribal 
self-determination.3 
Why a Crossroads?
As mentioned above, the conflict between tribal self-determination 
and the trust responsibility is not confined to energy development 
in Indian Country. For example, nearly 10 years ago and prior to 
assuming his former post as assistant secretary for Indian Affairs, 
Kevin Washburn succinctly described the basic conflict when writing 
about tribal self-determination and federal criminal jurisdiction over 
Indian Country:
[R]eal self-determination has not been—and cannot be—
achieved until tribes can determine for themselves what is 
right and what is wrong on their own reservations … [i]n 
the absence of this power, Indian people must conform their 
actions to rules and value judgments imposed on them by 
outsiders. Such a scheme is a tremendous obstacle to true 
self-determination. … Increasing meaningful tribal self-de-
termination almost necessarily requires restoring a greater 
measure of tribal autonomy and reducing federal control on 
Indian reservations.4
The legacy and history of federal Indian policy and federal policy 
toward energy resource development in Indian Country, the potential 
wealth of energy resources on tribal lands, the pressing need for eco-
nomic development in Indian Country, and the impacts of the federal 
oversight and approval are all factors that have brought this conflict 
to the forefront in the field of energy development on tribal lands. 
Challenges Presented by the History of Federal Indian Policy
Like many resource-based issues in Indian Country, the legacy of the 
late 19th- and early 20th-century federal Allotment Era remains a 
challenge for energy development on tribal lands. The allotment of 
tribal lands resulted in tribes losing more than 90 million acres (an 
area about the size of Montana) and resulted in fractured ownership 
patterns of both the surface and subsurface estates on the remaining 
lands. In the century since allotment, these various interests have 
been further fractionated through their devise and descent over 
subsequent generations, and, more recently, both tribes and the 
federal government have worked to reacquire and consolidate these 
interests under tribal ownership. Nonetheless, on many reservations, 
allotment, non-Indian homesteading, and the passage of time have 
resulted in a checkerboard of surface and subsurface ownership. 
As a result, nontribal lands within a tribe’s reservation may be more 
attractive for development, because those lands are not subject to 
federal oversight like tribal lands. This competitive disadvantage has 
motivated many tribes to seek a more level playing field for develop-
ment of their own resources.5 
In addition to the legacy of allotment, the history of federal–
tribal relations plays a role in the current discussion over the 
federal–tribal relationship in energy development. Professor 
Judith Royster has aptly described federal policy toward energy 
The challenging and often conflicting forces of history, precedent, colonization, self-determination, and the federal government’s trust responsibility to Indian tribes make for many crossroads within the field of federal Indian law. Scholars and practitioners have struggled with a 
number of these intersections, including animal law in Indian Country, the ongoing 
viability of precedent, protection of tribal sacred sites, and tribal–state relations.1 
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development in Indian Country as a “microcosm of the history of 
federal–tribal relations during the last century.”6 Like those broad 
policies, the development of minerals and energy resources from 
tribal lands has evolved from an area of extensive federal control to 
one more balanced between tribal authority and federal oversight, 
although federal oversight remains. 
The first comprehensive federal effort to address development 
in Indian Country came at the close of the allotment period and, 
consistent with overarching federal policy at the time, represented 
an attempt to spur tribal governance and economic development.  
To do so, the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA), 25 U.S.C.  
§§ 396a-396g, put tribes in the position of lessors of tribal minerals 
and required tribal consent, subject to the approval of the secretary 
of the Interior, for each mineral lease. Despite this statutory com-
mitment to tribal authority, however, the role of the federal govern-
ment, largely through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), remained 
pervasive, and, aside from a tribe’s consent to leasing, the federal 
government largely controlled the details of the lease negotiation 
process for decades after the passage of the IMLA.
Nearly 50 years later and largely in response to tribal frustration 
with their inability to exercise greater control and flexibility over 
resource development on their lands, Congress passed the 1982 
Indian Mineral Development Act (IMDA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108. 
Unlike the IMLA, which authorized only leases of tribal minerals, 
IMDA allowed tribes to negotiate and enter a variety of arrangements 
for mineral development, including a “joint venture, operating, pro-
duction sharing, service, managerial, lease or other agreement …”7 
The IMDA still mandated approval by the secretary of the Interior 
for each such agreement, however, and, in light of the greater risk 
of potential loss associated with a broader range of agreements, 
also provided that “the United States shall not be liable for losses 
sustained by a tribe” as a result of a mineral agreement.8
Thus, under both the IMLA and the IMDA, some form of federal 
approval is required for most every potential development project 
on tribal land. This requirement, rooted in the federal govern-
ment’s trust responsibility to protect tribes and their best interests, 
inherently conflicts with tribal autonomy over such projects and, by 
involving the federal bureaucracy in the review and approval process 
for each such project, often results in delays.9 Both the structure and 
the poor federal administration of the trust relationship prompted 
former Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Kevin Gover to assert 
that, unless tribes are authorized “… to assume final approval au-
thority over transactions involving trust lands, economic progress in 
Indian Country will continue to be hindered by the trust.”10 The need 
for federal approval of leases and agreements under the IMLA and 
IMDA—a requirement rooted in the federal trust responsibility—and 
the costs, burdens, and delays caused by that approval process have 
motivated tribes, particularly those with advanced governance and 
technical capabilities, to reconsider whether the current iteration of 
the trust relationship actually serves their best interests.
Indian Country’s Energy Potential
The energy resource potential of Indian lands is also a driving factor 
behind the ongoing discussion of new approaches to energy devel-
opment in Indian Country. Tribal lands offer significant opportunities 
for renewable and nonrenewable energy development. For example, 
according to a Department of Energy study, although tribal lands ac-
count for only 2 percent of the nation’s land base, they offer an esti-
mated 5 percent of all of the nation’s renewable energy resources. Of 
these resources, tribal solar energy potential amounts to 5.1 percent 
of the nation’s overall generation potential, while wind resources are 
approximately 3.4 percent of the total national technical potential.11 
Tribal lands also contain an enormous amount of traditional energy 
resources, including estimates of up to 5.3 billion barrels of oil, 37.9 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 53.7 billion tons of recoverable 
coal potential.12 
Need for Economic Development
The potential for energy development in Indian Country can perhaps 
only be matched by the need for successful and sustainable job 
creation and long-term tribal economic development. While some 
tribes have been able to capitalize on their resources, many in Indian 
Country still face grinding poverty and related social ills, while tribal 
governments rely heavily on federal funding to provide programs and 
services for their members. 
The need for sustainable economic development in Indian Coun-
try combined with the substantial potential of tribal energy resources 
has led many to question why tribes are not better able to take ad-
vantage of their own energy resources. In fact, these questions have 
generated substantial bipartisan congressional attention in recent 
years, particularly among members of the Senate Indian Affairs Com-
mittee. Most recently, the chairman of that committee, Sen. John 
Thus, under both the IMLA and the IMDA, some form of federal approval is  
required for most every potential development project on tribal land. This 
requirement, rooted in the federal government’s trust responsibility to protect  
tribes and their best interests, inherently conflicts with tribal autonomy over  
such projects and, by involving the federal bureaucracy in the review and  
approval process for each such project, often results in delays.
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Barrasso (R-Wyo.), commissioned the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to study the barriers to tribal energy development. 
2015 GAO Report on Energy Development on Indian Lands
The GAO’s report, “Poor Management by BIA Has Hindered Energy 
Development on Indian Lands,” was issued in June 2015 and docu-
mented a number of missed development opportunities, lost revenue, 
and threatened projects across tribal lands.13 According to the GAO’s 
analysis, many of the challenges to these projects were caused by or 
at least significantly due to delays in the federal review and approval 
process for the project documents. According to the GAO, the factors 
contributing to these delays were numerous and included administra-
tive issues within the BIA, such as a lack of accurate data (compound-
ed by the complex land ownership patterns resulting from allotment), 
staff limitations, and the absence of any system for tracking of review 
and response times on the part of the federal agency. The report also 
blamed the complex regulatory framework associated with federal 
review and approval of proposed projects on tribal lands, including 
review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), applica-
bility of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA), and the involvement of both the BIA and 
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) as well as other federal agen-
cies. In addition to these predominantly federal issues, the report also 
noted other challenges, such as the dual taxation of tribal projects, 
and tribal-specific issues, such as a challenging capital market, lack of 
infrastructure, and tribal capacity. The GAO report confirmed many 
tribal concerns with the federal role in energy development and un-
derscored the issues on which recent proposals for promoting energy 
development in Indian Country focus.
The GAO report also addressed a separate but related topic 
that has prompted the move for reform. In addition to studying the 
impediments to tribal development, Barrasso also asked the GAO to 
study why no tribe had yet entered into a Tribal Energy Resource 
Agreement (TERA) pursuant to provisions of Title V of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, also known as the Indian Tribal Energy Develop-
ment and Self-Determination Act (ITEDSDA), codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 3501-3506. TERAs were intended to enhance and empower 
tribes to approve energy-related agreements as a way to ameliorate 
many of the issues found by the GAO’s review. In fact, all of the 
same factors that are driving the current discussion of tribal energy 
development also motivated the enactment of the ITEDSDA in 2005. 
In addition, the more recent Helping Expedite and Advance Respon-
sible Tribal Homeownership (HEARTH) Act, enacted in 2012 and 
codified in relevant part at 25 U.S.C. §415(h), sought to ameliorate 
the same issues as they relate to leasing tribal surface lands, includ-
ing for solar and wind projects. Though each of these reforms has its 
own shortcomings, they are worthy of review, because they inform 
the most recent proposals for reform. 
A Decade of New Approaches? TERAs and the HEARTH Act
TERAs were intended to usher in the beginning of a new ap-
proach to tribal self-determination and potentially a new era in the 
federal–tribal relationship. Once negotiated between a tribe and 
the secretary of the Interior, a TERA would authorize the tribe to 
review and approve energy-related leases, business agreements, 
and rights-of-way for projects on tribal lands without the need for 
federal approval of each individual lease, agreement, or right-of-
way. In doing so, TERAs changed the balance of the federal–tribal 
relationship by empowering tribes to exercise decision-making 
authority over their own resources without federal oversight of 
each such decision. Ideally, this tribal authority in lieu of federal 
oversight would significantly minimize, if not eliminate, the prob-
lems associated with mismanagement by the BIA identified by the 
GAO in its 2015 report. 
But, as is the case with other recent efforts to promote tribal 
authority, such empowerment came with conditions, many of which 
have been identified by tribes, scholars, and the GAO as disincen-
tives for tribes to seek a TERA.14 These issues include the require-
ment that, as part of a TERA, a tribe must provide an environmental 
review process allowing for public (including nontribal) review and 
comment on proposed leases, agreements, and rights-of-way. In addi-
tion, much like under IMDA, the federal government would be liable 
neither for “any negotiated term” of any such agreement, lease, or 
right-of-way approved by a tribe nor any losses therefrom, although 
this waiver presumably allows for liability that may result from other 
sources, such as non-negotiated terms of such agreements. The GAO 
also identified that tribes considering a TERA have been uncertain 
over the amount of authority for which they could actually nego-
tiate, as the regulations implementing ITEDSDA allowed tribes to 
assume “activities normally carried out by the Department [of the 
Interior] except for inherently Federal functions.”15 This regulatory 
restriction came without definition of what might be considered an 
“inherently Federal function” and, therefore, left tribes guessing as 
to the potential scope of a TERA. The GAO also noted that tribes 
were concerned that their assumption of additional responsibilities 
under a TERA would come with no additional federal funding. Lastly, 
the ITEDSDA required the secretary of the Interior to determine the 
capacity of an applicant tribe to carry out the functions of a TERA—
and the process for rendering that determination, along with the 
complex TERA application process, have also been disincentives to 
tribal participation. Thus, the promise of a new, more tribal sover-
eignty-oriented dynamic embodied by TERAs has not yet come to 
pass, leading some to question whether the TERA model is the right 
model for the future.16
Unlike the ITEDSDA, as of November 2015, some two dozen 
Indian tribes have taken advantage of the provisions of the HEARTH 
Act, which, like TERAs, authorize greater tribal authority and control 
over tribal lands. The foundational concepts underlying the HEARTH 
Act were first articulated in legislative amendments that authorized 
specific tribes, like the Navajo Nation, to lease their surface lands 
without the need for secretarial approval of each lease. Like those 
early tribal-specific models, under the HEARTH Act, tribes can now 
submit proposed leasing regulations to the secretary for approval 
and—provided the regulations are “consistent with” federal leasing 
regulations and include a tribal environmental review process similar 
to that required in a TERA—the secretary can approve the regula-
tions and authorize a tribe to approve individual leases in accordance 
with those tribal rules. The HEARTH Act is limited, however, to sur-
face leasing, which includes leases for business purposes, like solar, 
wind, and biomass development projects, but does not authorize trib-
al subsurface leasing or the granting of rights-of-way. In addition, the 
HEARTH Act waives the liability of the United States for any “losses 
sustained by any party to a lease” approved by a tribe pursuant to 
that tribe’s regulations. This waiver of federal liability is broader than 
the waiver under a TERA, which is limited to waiving liability that 
flows only from a “negotiated term” of an agreement.
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From enactment of the HEARTH Act in 2012 to November 
2015, some 20 tribes have obtained secretarial approval of their 
tribal business leasing regulations. Even so, however, the GAO 
report found that, as of March 2015, only one utility-scale wind fa-
cility is in operation on tribal land, with one more such facility and 
one utility-scale solar facility under construction. By comparison, 
since 2005, 686 utility-scale wind projects and 778 utility-scale 
solar projects have been constructed on nontribal lands.17 In addi-
tion, many of the same concerns that have been expressed about 
TERAs, such as the required environmental review process and 
waiver of federal liability, are equally applicable to the HEARTH 
Act.18 Lastly, the HEARTH Act does not provide a tribe with 
comprehensive authority to pursue energy development, as it 
addresses only surface leasing authority and does not allow tribes 
to approve rights-of-way that might be necessary and incidental 
to such surface development.
Therefore, although recent attempts to reform and enhance the 
authority of tribes to develop their own energy resources began 
as early as the 2005 passage of ITEDSDA, the 2015 GAO report 
indicated significant impediments to such development remain. 
According to the GAO, many of those impediments result from the 
federal government’s role in the process. Thus, the appropriate 
balance between the federal trust responsibility and tribal self-de-
termination is central to alleviating the challenges to tribal energy 
development. As a result, a number of the pending proposals could 
alter that balance and, potentially, lead to a new era of more mean-
ingful tribal self-determination like that described by Washburn.
Next Stop, True Self-Determination?
The current proposals to address the barriers to tribal energy devel-
opment are varied in their approaches; some seek to amend specific 
parts of existing law by streamlining the present structure, while 
others envision entirely new approaches, and still others propose 
to apply existing structures in new ways. The current proposals 
also range from promoting nearly independent tribal autonomy 
(by authorizing a tribe to request that its lands be removed from 
federally owned trust status altogether) to seeking improvements in 
administration of the current federal trust model. The remainder of 
this article reviews each of these proposals in light of its respective 
approach to the federal–tribal relationship.
Administration Proposals
The GAO report included specific recommendations for executive 
action on the part of the BIA to address the administrative issues 
identified in the report. These recommendations included improving 
BIA’s ability to determine ownership, collect data, and track review 
and response times, as well as providing additional guidance regard-
ing “inherently Federal functions” and improving the efficacy of the 
agency’s grant programs.19 While these recommendations focus on 
specific aspects of the BIA’s administrative management of the fed-
eral trust responsibility, officials who oversee BIA’s functions within 
the Department of the Interior have also offered some proposals for 
broader reform. 
In written testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs for an oversight hearing on the GAO report before that com-
mittee, Larry Roberts, now acting assistant secretary of Indian Affairs, 
highlighted the agency’s efforts to “break[ ] down the silos that create 
obstacles to close coordination in the federal bureaucracy …” and 
proposed to continue that effort through the development of an Indian 
Energy Service Center.20 The service center is proposed in Obama’s 
2016 budget and, according to Roberts’ testimony, would consolidate 
federal resources, such as BIA, BLM, trust officers, and others, in 
one location “to maintain a responsive, administrative and technical 
capacity, that when needed, can bolster local or regional staff faced 
with surging workload thus avoiding or eliminating backlogs.”21 Given 
the GAO’s findings regarding the BIA’s administrative issues and the 
complexity of the underlying federal regulatory process, however, it 
remains to be seen whether the service center would ameliorate these 
issues or compound them by consolidating them into one location. 
Regardless, the service center proposal would not realign the federal 
government’s relationship with Indian tribes but, ideally, would stream-
line the federal role within that relationship.
Beyond streamlining the existing process, Interior officials also 
support broader legislative reform that would expand the HEARTH 
Act model to allow tribal authority over subsurface leasing. In 2014, 
Washburn urged the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs to consider 
broader application of the HEARTH Act instead of more detailed 
amendments to ITEDSDA.22 More recently, Roberts further urged 
the committee to consider amending the IMDA to incorporate the 
HEARTH Act model.23 In doing so, the department highlighted the 
HEARTH Act’s promotion of tribal sovereignty and relative success 
In addition to studying the impediments to tribal development, Barrasso also 
asked the GAO to study why no tribe had yet entered into a Tribal Energy Resource 
Agreement (TERA) pursuant to provisions of Title V of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
also known as the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act 
(ITEDSDA), codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506. TERAs were intended to enhance 
and empower tribes to approve energy-related agreements as a way to ameliorate 
many of the issues found by the GAO’s review.
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in comparison to the lack of tribes that have pursued a TERA. Wash-
burn also indicated Interior’s preference for the broader waiver of the 
federal government’s liability under the HEARTH Act as compared 
with ITESDA’s narrower waiver for liability related to a “negotiated 
term” because, according to Washburn, the latter lacks clarity.24 
As discussed in more detail below, although Interior officials 
prefer the HEARTH Act over the TERA model, Washburn has also 
recognized that expanding the HEARTH Act from surface leasing 
to subsurface mineral leasing and development presents a complex 
challenge. For example, while tribal surface leasing regulations 
under the HEARTH Act must be consistent with a single and fairly 
straightforward body of federal regulations, the IMLA and the IMDA 
each have their own separate and far more detailed regulatory 
schemes.25 Therefore, while the HEARTH Act model has also found 
some support in pending congressional legislation, those bills have 
not yet been consistent with the department’s position and include 
additional provisions that either support the TERA model or raise 
other objections from the Obama administration.
S. 209, ITEDSA Amendments of 2015
Reintroduced in the 114th Congress by Barrasso and based on simi-
lar proposals in each of the last three Congresses, S. 209, the Indian 
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act Amend-
ments of 2015, aims to address many of the TERA-related issues 
identified in the 2015 GAO report. For example, the bill would pro-
vide additional funding for tribes seeking to develop capacity to enter 
a TERA and ease the secretary’s standards for determining whether 
a tribe has sufficient capacity. Under this legislation, a tribe would 
only need to demonstrate successful management of a relevant 
self-determination contract to meet the capacity threshold to enter a 
TERA. Likewise, the bill would confine the TERA approval process to 
an established timeframe and limit the secretary’s ability to decline 
a TERA. Importantly, the bill also confirms that ITEDSDA does not 
waive any federal liability beyond that resulting from a “negotiated 
term” of an agreement approved by a tribe under a TERA, meaning 
that the United States could be liable under actions arising outside of 
the negotiated terms of an agreement. The bill also expands the cov-
erage of a potential TERA to include a broader range of agreements, 
including communitization and pooling agreements. As passed by the 
Senate, the legislation also includes a number of non-ITEDSA-related 
provisions, including (1) authorizing tribal biomass demonstration 
and weatherization projects; (2) relaxing the federal appraisal 
requirements for energy-related projects; and (3) expanding the Na-
vajo Nation’s leasing authority to include the approval mineral leases 
of up to 25 years without secretarial approval. 
S. 209 is focused on improving the TERA-model and fixing the 
issues identified by the GAO as disincentives for tribes considering 
a TERA. As such, the bill primarily recommits to the TERA model 
as the path forward for the federal–tribal relationship in the field of 
energy development. It remains to be seen whether, if enacted, the 
revisions to the TERA standards and process contained in S. 209 
would be sufficient to overcome the challenges that have led many to 
consider the TERA approach a failure. 
Of S. 209’s non-TERA-focused provisions, the expansion of 
Navajo Nation leasing authority to subsurface resources also lends 
support to the HEARTH Act model but not in the same manner 
envisioned by the Department of the Interior. Just as the HEARTH 
Act’s roots began with expansion of surface leasing authority on a 
tribe-by-tribe basis (and the Navajo Nation was one of the first tribes 
to assume such authority), the proposal to expand Navajo leasing 
authority to subsurface resources could be a precursor to expanding 
the HEARTH Act beyond surface leasing. 
Unlike the most recent proposal from Roberts to amend IMDA to 
incorporate concepts from the HEARTH Act, however, S. 209 pro-
poses to incorporate subsurface leasing into the Navajo Nation’s ex-
isting leasing authority by amending 25 U.S.C. § 415(e)(1) to include 
tribal authority to approve “lease[s] for the exploration, development, 
or extraction of any mineral resource,” provided the Nation’s leasing 
regulations have been approved by the secretary of the Interior.26 
When questioned about this proposal in an earlier version of S. 209, 
Washburn indicated that the department had some concerns because 
“mineral development is more complicated than business site leases 
… or surface leases … [and] … there are some slight differences in 
the way the HEARTH Act works and the way energy leasing needs 
to work.”27 Thus, if S. 209 were enacted, it remains unclear whether 
and how the Department of the Interior would review and approve 
mineral leasing regulations proposed by the Navajo Nation. 
Ultimately, expansion of the HEARTH Act model to subsurface 
development, whether through the Navajo Nation proposal in S. 209 
or the IMDA amendment proposal of the Department of the Interior, 
is complicated by the differences between surface and subsurface 
leasing. Washburn recognized these differences in commenting on 
the Navajo Nation proposal, and the GAO report’s description of the 
complex regulatory scheme applicable to energy development on 
tribal lands further highlights the potential challenges of marrying 
the HEARTH Act with mineral development. And, notwithstanding 
the 20 tribes that have taken advantage of the HEARTH Act for 
surface leasing, the Act’s waiver of federal liability and required envi-
ronmental review process may deter tribes from pursuing authority 
for subsurface leasing, as evidenced by apparent tribal reluctance 
toward TERAs based in part on related concerns. Therefore, while 
supported in some form by the Obama administration and proposed 
in Congress, expansion of the HEARTH Act to subsurface develop-
ment will likely require significant additional analysis and consider-
ation before becoming a reality. Even so, a bill including a provision 
like that of S. 209 that would expand HEARTH Act-like authority 
for subsurface leasing to the Navajo Nation has already passed the 
House, although its chances of success are likely doomed by its other 
provisions that would restrict the applicability of other federal laws 
and rules to energy-related projects on tribal lands.
H.R. 538, Native American Energy Act 
H.R. 538, the Native American Energy Act, was introduced by Rep. 
Don Young (R-Ark.), chair of the House Subcommittee on Indian, 
Insular, and Alaska Native Affairs, to address a variety of issues 
related to tribal energy development. Like S. 209, H.R. 538 includes 
provisions addressing appraisals and authorizing an expansion of 
leasing authority for the Navajo Nation. This bill would also limit 
NEPA and judicial review of energy-related projects on tribal lands 
and, absent tribal consent, would prohibit the application of the 
BLM’s recently promulgated rule regarding hydraulic fracturing on 
tribal land. Thus, aside from promoting the possible expansion of the 
HEARTH Act model for subsurface leasing at the Navajo Nation, this 
bill primarily focuses on minimizing the existing federal review and 
approval process and potential for legal challenges to tribal projects 
rather than rebalancing federal and tribal responsibilities. Although 
April 2016 • THE FEDERAL LAWYER •  55
the bill passed the House, Obama, expressing displeasure with the 
bill’s limits on NEPA, judicial review, and the BLM’s rule regarding 
hydraulic fracturing, issued a Statement of Administration Policy 
opposing the bill.28 Thus, H.R. 538 is unlikely to become law in its 
current form, but, given the inclusion of a few provisions also found 
in S. 209, it seems possible that a compromise measure could have 
some prospect of success, provided the political divide between the 
Obama administration and Rep. Young allows room for compromise.
H.R. 328, American Indian Empowerment Act
Another potentially controversial measure, also introduced by Young, 
awaits further consideration in the House. H.R. 328, the American 
Indian Empowerment Act, would authorize an Indian tribe to request 
that lands held by the federal government in trust for its benefit be 
transferred to the tribe in restricted fee status. According to the 
bill, once transferred, the lands would retain their Indian Country 
status as well as restrictions on alienability and taxation, but a tribe 
would be able to approve leases and rights-of-way across such lands 
without the need for federal approval. In addition, tribal law would 
preempt federal laws and regulations on such lands provided, how-
ever, the tribal laws had first been published in the Federal Register. 
Notwithstanding the authority for a tribe to seek the withdrawal of 
its lands from trust status, the final section of the bill makes clear 
that nothing in the bill should be construed to diminish the federal 
government’s trust responsibilities. The legislation does not specify 
the scope of those trust responsibilities for a tribe that elects to 
withdraw its lands from trust status. Thus, although the American 
Indian Empowerment Act presents the potential for enhanced tribal 
decision-making authority and self-determination over tribal lands, 
the removal of those lands from trust status and uncertainty over the 
resulting obligations of the federal government have raised for some 
the specter of the termination era of the 1950s, during which the 
federal government sought to end entirely its trust relationship with 
Indian tribes.29 In response to these concerns, Young has sought to 
emphasize that he intended the legislation to begin a discussion on 
how federal policy can move toward increased tribal self-determina-
tion.30 Nevertheless, aside from a 2012 subcommittee hearing on H.R. 
328’s predecessor, this proposal has not advanced in Congress.
S. 383, Indian Trust Asset Reform Act (also H.R. 812)
An additional intriguing opportunity for promotion of tribal self-de-
termination does not expressly focus on tribal energy development 
at all. Rather, S. 383 (and its House companion H.R. 812), the Indian 
Trust Asset Reform Act, addresses trust assets more broadly, but its 
proposed expansion of tribal responsibility for those assets, poten-
tially including surface and subsurface trust resources, has particular 
relevance in the context of energy development and in comparison 
to the existing TERA and HEARTH Act models. 
As a starting point, the bill would reaffirm the trust responsibility 
to “include a duty to promote tribal self-determination regarding 
governmental authority and economic development.” In furtherance 
of that policy, Title II of the bill authorizes “trust asset management 
demonstration project[s],” which would allow a tribe to request and 
assume responsibility for the management of trust assets, includ-
ing the authority to approve surface leasing or forest management 
agreements without secretarial review and approval in a manner 
consistent with existing statutory authority under the HEARTH Act 
(for surface leasing) or the National Indian Forest Management Act 
(NIFRMA) (for forest management agreements).31 
In order to enter such a demonstration project, a tribe would 
have to petition the secretary and develop a trust asset manage-
ment plan, which must include a description of the trust assets to 
be managed, the tribal management objectives and priorities for 
those assets, funding sources, and dispute resolution mechanisms. 
In addition, the proposed plan need not be consistent with federal 
regulations but must “identify any Federal regulations that will be 
superseded by the plan.”32 Unlike the complicated and confusing 
capacity and application requirements for entering a TERA, the sec-
retary must approve a trust asset management plan unless the plan 
(1) is inconsistent with the existing “treaties, statutes, Executive 
orders, and court decisions” applicable to the relevant trust assets or 
their management; (2) does not include one of the required compo-
nents described above; or (3) will result in implementation costs that 
exceed available funding.33 
With respect to the potential liability of the federal government, 
the bill confirms that neither the liability of the federal government 
nor that of an Indian tribe would be “independently diminish[ed], 
increase[d], create[d] or otherwise affect[ed]” by the legislation or by 
a trust asset management plan. Importantly, however, for trust assets 
managed by a tribe pursuant to a trust asset management plan, the 
bill would waive federal liability for losses that may result from a 
term of the plan that “provides for management” of the trust asset 
at a “less-stringent standard than the Secretary would otherwise 
require or adhere to in absence of an Indian trust asset management 
plan.” This provision is remarkable in two respects. First, the waiver 
of federal liability is quite narrow but prompts due consideration of 
the risks associated with managing trust assets differently than the 
federal government. Second and perhaps more revolutionary, the 
provision recognizes that, although trust asset management must be 
consistent with broader applicable law, a tribe may decide to manage 
a trust asset differently than the federal government and may do so 
at a “less stringent standard.”34 
Although the current version of S. 383 does not authorize tribes 
to independently approve a lease or agreement unless done in 
accordance with the HEARTH Act, the bill would authorize a tribe 
to manage its own trust assets as the tribe sees fit, notwithstanding 
otherwise applicable federal regulations and even if federal manage-
ment standards under those regulations would be more stringent. 
That recognition of tribal authority marks a step away from the notion 
that, in order to exercise authority over trust resources, tribes must 
conform to federal regulatory standards. Under the HEARTH Act, for 
example, tribal leasing regulations must be “consistent with” federal 
regulations. Similarly, the regulations implementing a TERA left un-
certainty over what constitutes an “inherent Federal function” and, by 
doing so, potentially limited tribal authority under a TERA to activities 
that do not require the federal (i.e., more stringent) protection of 
tribal trust resources. As one tribal leader stated in written testimony 
discussing S. 383 in the context of a Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs hearing on trust modernization: “Unlike existing legal author-
ities that authorize tribes to contract or compact federal functions 
under federal standards, this demonstration project is unique in that it 
would provide participating tribes the freedom to determine how their 
resources will be managed under tribal standards.”35 This small step, 
along with the legislation’s express affirmation that the trust respon-
sibility includes supporting tribal self-determination for economic 
development purposes, could be a significant starting point for a new 
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approach to tribal self-determination that 
would allow for greater tribal authority and 
flexibility in the management of trust assets, 
including surface and potentially subsurface 
resources for energy development. 
Conclusion
A number of factors continue to motivate 
the ongoing discussion of federal trust 
responsibility and tribal self-determination 
in the area of tribal energy development. 
The June 2015 GAO report described herein 
drew additional attention from Congress, 
interested tribes, and officials of the Obama 
administration. The future of energy 
development on tribal lands depends on 
whether this additional focus will result in 
broader support for a particular approach 
to addressing the issues identified by the 
GAO, many of which stem from the balance 
between tribal self-determination and the 
federal trust responsibility. As described 
above, the current proposals represent a 
broad range of perspectives on the future 
of self-determination and federal oversight, 
from maintaining the current tribal-federal 
relationship and working to improve the 
federal review and approval process to 
allowing each tribe to decide whether to 
remove tribal trust lands from federal own-
ership. Between these extremes lie proposals to expand or improve 
the existing TERA or HEARTH Act models, each of which presents 
its own complications. In addition, the Indian Trust Asset Reform 
Act proposes a recommitment of the federal trust responsibility but 
emphasizes the promotion of tribal self-determination for govern-
mental authority and economic development, not just the federal 
protection and oversight of tribal resources. This commitment, along 
with the recognition that each tribe is in the best position to decide 
how to manage its own trust resources and may do so differently 
than the federal government, could help redefine the federal–tribal 
relationship in energy development and beyond. Ultimately, a new 
era of tribal self-determination appears just over the horizon, and, 
although the precise path from the current crossroads to that new 
era is presently unclear, it will most likely incorporate the concepts 
currently being debated in the context of energy development on 
tribal lands. 
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